Fix bug when rendering HTML links

layouts/_default/_markup/render-link.html

@@ -1 +1 @@
-<a href="{{ .Destination | safeURL }}"{{ with .Title}} title="{{ . }}"{{ end }}{{ if strings.HasPrefix .Destination "http" }} target="_blank"{{ end }}>{{- .Text | safeHTML -}}</a>
+<a href="{{ .Destination | safeURL }}"{{ with .Title}} title="{{ . }}"{{ end }}{{ if strings.HasPrefix .Destination "http" }} target="_blank"{{ end }}>{{- .Text | safeHTML -}}</a>

public/1/index.html

@@ -62,8 +62,8 @@
   "keywords": [
     "business cycles", "DMP model", "frictional unemployment", "job rationing", "job vacancies", "matching model", "recessions", "rationing unemployment", "unemployment", "wage rigidity"
   ],
-  "articleBody": " Paper Online appendix Code and data Abstract This paper proposes a search-and-matching model of unemployment in which jobs are rationed: the labor market does not clear in the absence of matching frictions. This job shortage arises in an economic equilibrium from the combination of some wage rigidity and diminishing marginal returns to labor. In recessions, job rationing is acute, driving the rise in unemployment, whereas matching frictions contribute little to unemployment. Intuitively in recessions, jobs are lacking, the labor market is slack, and recruiting is easy and inexpensive, so matching frictions do not matter much. In a calibrated model, cyclical fluctuations in the composition of unemployment are large.\nFigure 5: Rationing and frictional unemployment in the United States, 1964–2009 Citation Michaillat, Pascal. 2012. “Do Matching Frictions Explain Unemployment? Not in Bad Times.” American Economic Review 102 (4): 1721–1750. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.4.1721 .\n@article{M12, author = {Pascal Michaillat}, year = {2012}, title = {Do Matching Frictions Explain Unemployment? Not in Bad Times}, journal = {American Economic Review}, volume = {102}, number = {4}, pages = {1721--1750}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.4.1721}} Related material Presentation slides Nontechnical summary for CentrePiece PhD dissertation (2010) – My PhD dissertation at UC Berkeley is the basis for this paper. Chapter 2 in particular provides intuition for the main results of the paper based on an elementary, urn-ball model of the labor market. ",
-  "wordCount" : "223",
+  "articleBody": " Paper Online appendix Code and data Abstract This paper proposes a search-and-matching model of unemployment in which jobs are rationed: the labor market does not clear in the absence of matching frictions. This job shortage arises in an economic equilibrium from the combination of some wage rigidity and diminishing marginal returns to labor. In recessions, job rationing is acute, driving the rise in unemployment, whereas matching frictions contribute little to unemployment. Intuitively in recessions, jobs are lacking, the labor market is slack, and recruiting is easy and inexpensive, so matching frictions do not matter much. In a calibrated model, cyclical fluctuations in the composition of unemployment are large.\nFigure 5: Rationing and frictional unemployment in the United States, 1964–2009 Citation Michaillat, Pascal. 2012. “Do Matching Frictions Explain Unemployment? Not in Bad Times.” American Economic Review 102 (4): 1721–1750. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.4.1721.\n@article{M12, author = {Pascal Michaillat}, year = {2012}, title = {Do Matching Frictions Explain Unemployment? Not in Bad Times}, journal = {American Economic Review}, volume = {102}, number = {4}, pages = {1721--1750}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.4.1721}} Related material Presentation slides Nontechnical summary for CentrePiece PhD dissertation (2010) – My PhD dissertation at UC Berkeley is the basis for this paper. Chapter 2 in particular provides intuition for the main results of the paper based on an elementary, urn-ball model of the labor market. ",
+  "wordCount" : "222",
   "inLanguage": "en",
   "image":"https://pascalmichaillat.org/1s.png","datePublished": "2012-06-01T00:00:00Z",
   "dateModified": "2024-10-01T00:00:00Z",
@@ -181,12 +181,9 @@ <h1 class="post-title entry-hint-parent">
   </header> 
   <div class="post-content"><hr>
 <ul>
-<li><a href="/1.pdf">Paper</a>
-</li>
-<li><a href="/1a.pdf">Online appendix</a>
-</li>
-<li><a href="https://github.com/pmichaillat/job-rationing" target="_blank">Code and data</a>
-</li>
+<li><a href="/1.pdf">Paper</a></li>
+<li><a href="/1a.pdf">Online appendix</a></li>
+<li><a href="https://github.com/pmichaillat/job-rationing" target="_blank">Code and data</a></li>
 </ul>
 <hr>
 <h5 id="abstract">Abstract</h5>
@@ -197,8 +194,7 @@ <h5 id="figure-5-rationing-and-frictional-unemployment-in-the-united-states-1964
 </p>
 <hr>
 <h5 id="citation">Citation</h5>
-<p>Michaillat, Pascal. 2012. &ldquo;Do Matching Frictions Explain Unemployment? Not in Bad Times.&rdquo; <em>American Economic Review</em> 102 (4): 1721–1750. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.4.1721" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.4.1721</a>
-.</p>
+<p>Michaillat, Pascal. 2012. &ldquo;Do Matching Frictions Explain Unemployment? Not in Bad Times.&rdquo; <em>American Economic Review</em> 102 (4): 1721–1750. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.4.1721" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.4.1721</a>.</p>
 <div class="highlight"><pre tabindex="0" style="background-color:#fff;-moz-tab-size:4;-o-tab-size:4;tab-size:4;"><code class="language-BibTeX" data-lang="BibTeX"><span style="display:flex;"><span><span style="color:#3f6e75">@article</span>{<span style="color:#000">M12</span>,
 </span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span><span style="color:#836c28">author</span> = <span style="color:#c41a16">{Pascal Michaillat}</span>,
 </span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span><span style="color:#836c28">year</span> = <span style="color:#c41a16">{2012}</span>,
@@ -211,12 +207,9 @@ <h5 id="citation">Citation</h5>
 </span></span></code></pre></div><hr>
 <h5 id="related-material">Related material</h5>
 <ul>
-<li><a href="/1p.pdf">Presentation slides</a>
-</li>
-<li><a href="https://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/cp365.pdf" target="_blank">Nontechnical summary for CentrePiece</a>
-</li>
-<li><a href="https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7jr3m96r" target="_blank">PhD dissertation (2010)</a>
- – My PhD dissertation at UC Berkeley is the basis for this paper. Chapter 2 in particular provides intuition for the main results of the paper based on an elementary, urn-ball model of the labor market.</li>
+<li><a href="/1p.pdf">Presentation slides</a></li>
+<li><a href="https://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/cp365.pdf" target="_blank">Nontechnical summary for CentrePiece</a></li>
+<li><a href="https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7jr3m96r" target="_blank">PhD dissertation (2010)</a> – My PhD dissertation at UC Berkeley is the basis for this paper. Chapter 2 in particular provides intuition for the main results of the paper based on an elementary, urn-ball model of the labor market.</li>
 </ul>
 
   </div>

public/10/index.html

@@ -62,8 +62,8 @@
   "keywords": [
     "beetles", "homophily", "Kuhnian model", "metascience", "phase diagrams", "paradigms", "scientific progress", "scientific revolutions", "tenure", "Youden index"
   ],
-  "articleBody": " Paper Online appendix Significance It is believed that a lack of experimental evidence (typical in the social sciences) slows but does not prevent the adoption of true theories. We evaluate this belief using a model of scientific research and promotion in which tenured scientists are slightly biased toward tenure candidates with similar beliefs. We find that when a science lacks evidence to discriminate between theories, or when tenure decisions do not rely on available evidence, true theories may not be adopted. The nonadoption of heliocentric theory in the 16th century, the persistence of bloodletting in the 19th century, the nonadoption of underconsumption theory in the early 20th century, and the persistence of radical mastectomy in the 20th century illustrate such risk.\nAbstract We develop a model describing how false paradigms may persist, hindering scientific progress. The model features two paradigms, one describing reality better than the other. Tenured scientists display homophily: they favor tenure candidates who adhere to their paradigm. As in statistics, power is the probability (absent any bias) of denying tenure to scientists adhering to the false paradigm. The model shows that because of homophily, when power is low, the false paradigm may prevail. Then only an increase in power can ignite convergence to the true paradigm. Historical case studies suggest that low power comes either from lack of empirical evidence, or from reluctance to base tenure decisions on available evidence.\nFigure 1A: Dynamics of the share of Better scientists in the tenured population in a scientific field with high power Figure 1B: Dynamics of the share of Better scientists in the tenured population in a scientific field with low power Citation Akerlof, George A., and Pascal Michaillat. 2018. “Persistence of False Paradigms in Low-Power Sciences.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115 (52): 13228–13233. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1816454115 .\n@article{AM18, author = {George A. Akerlof and Pascal Michaillat}, year = {2018}, title = {Persistence of False Paradigms in Low-Power Sciences}, journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences}, volume = {115}, number = {52}, pages = {13228--13233}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1816454115}} Related material Nontechnical summary for the Berkeley Initiative for Transparency in the Social Sciences Previous version of the paper (2017) – This version of the paper develops a heory of promotion based on evaluations by the already promoted. The already promoted show some favoritism toward candidates for promotion with similar beliefs, just as beetles are more prone to eat the eggs of other species. With such egg-eating bias, false beliefs may not be eliminated by the promotion system. An application is to the scientific process; another application is to hierarchical organizations. In organizations, egg-eating bias can result in the capture of the top of organizations by the wrong-minded. ",
-  "wordCount" : "450",
+  "articleBody": " Paper Online appendix Significance It is believed that a lack of experimental evidence (typical in the social sciences) slows but does not prevent the adoption of true theories. We evaluate this belief using a model of scientific research and promotion in which tenured scientists are slightly biased toward tenure candidates with similar beliefs. We find that when a science lacks evidence to discriminate between theories, or when tenure decisions do not rely on available evidence, true theories may not be adopted. The nonadoption of heliocentric theory in the 16th century, the persistence of bloodletting in the 19th century, the nonadoption of underconsumption theory in the early 20th century, and the persistence of radical mastectomy in the 20th century illustrate such risk.\nAbstract We develop a model describing how false paradigms may persist, hindering scientific progress. The model features two paradigms, one describing reality better than the other. Tenured scientists display homophily: they favor tenure candidates who adhere to their paradigm. As in statistics, power is the probability (absent any bias) of denying tenure to scientists adhering to the false paradigm. The model shows that because of homophily, when power is low, the false paradigm may prevail. Then only an increase in power can ignite convergence to the true paradigm. Historical case studies suggest that low power comes either from lack of empirical evidence, or from reluctance to base tenure decisions on available evidence.\nFigure 1A: Dynamics of the share of Better scientists in the tenured population in a scientific field with high power Figure 1B: Dynamics of the share of Better scientists in the tenured population in a scientific field with low power Citation Akerlof, George A., and Pascal Michaillat. 2018. “Persistence of False Paradigms in Low-Power Sciences.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115 (52): 13228–13233. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1816454115.\n@article{AM18, author = {George A. Akerlof and Pascal Michaillat}, year = {2018}, title = {Persistence of False Paradigms in Low-Power Sciences}, journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences}, volume = {115}, number = {52}, pages = {13228--13233}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1816454115}} Related material Nontechnical summary for the Berkeley Initiative for Transparency in the Social Sciences Previous version of the paper (2017) – This version of the paper develops a heory of promotion based on evaluations by the already promoted. The already promoted show some favoritism toward candidates for promotion with similar beliefs, just as beetles are more prone to eat the eggs of other species. With such egg-eating bias, false beliefs may not be eliminated by the promotion system. An application is to the scientific process; another application is to hierarchical organizations. In organizations, egg-eating bias can result in the capture of the top of organizations by the wrong-minded. ",
+  "wordCount" : "449",
   "inLanguage": "en",
   "image":"https://pascalmichaillat.org/10s.png","datePublished": "2018-12-26T00:00:00Z",
   "dateModified": "2024-08-21T00:00:00Z",
@@ -184,10 +184,8 @@ <h1 class="post-title entry-hint-parent">
   </header> 
   <div class="post-content"><hr>
 <ul>
-<li><a href="/10.pdf">Paper</a>
-</li>
-<li><a href="/10a.pdf">Online appendix</a>
-</li>
+<li><a href="/10.pdf">Paper</a></li>
+<li><a href="/10a.pdf">Online appendix</a></li>
 </ul>
 <hr>
 <h4 id="significance">Significance</h4>
@@ -204,8 +202,7 @@ <h5 id="figure-1b--dynamics-of-the-share-of-better-scientists-in-the-tenured-pop
 </p>
 <hr>
 <h5 id="citation">Citation</h5>
-<p>Akerlof, George A., and Pascal Michaillat. 2018. &ldquo;Persistence of False Paradigms in Low-Power Sciences.&rdquo; <em>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences</em> 115 (52): 13228–13233. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1816454115" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1816454115</a>
-.</p>
+<p>Akerlof, George A., and Pascal Michaillat. 2018. &ldquo;Persistence of False Paradigms in Low-Power Sciences.&rdquo; <em>Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences</em> 115 (52): 13228–13233. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1816454115" target="_blank">https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1816454115</a>.</p>
 <div class="highlight"><pre tabindex="0" style="background-color:#fff;-moz-tab-size:4;-o-tab-size:4;tab-size:4;"><code class="language-BibTeX" data-lang="BibTeX"><span style="display:flex;"><span><span style="color:#3f6e75">@article</span>{<span style="color:#000">AM18</span>,
 </span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span><span style="color:#836c28">author</span> = <span style="color:#c41a16">{George A. Akerlof and Pascal Michaillat}</span>,
 </span></span><span style="display:flex;"><span><span style="color:#836c28">year</span> = <span style="color:#c41a16">{2018}</span>,
@@ -218,10 +215,8 @@ <h5 id="citation">Citation</h5>
 </span></span></code></pre></div><hr>
 <h5 id="related-material">Related material</h5>
 <ul>
-<li><a href="https://www.bitss.org/the-persistence-of-false-paradigms-in-low-power-sciences/" target="_blank">Nontechnical summary for the Berkeley Initiative for Transparency in the Social Sciences</a>
-</li>
-<li><a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w23523/w23523.pdf" target="_blank">Previous version of the paper (2017)</a>
- – This version of the paper develops a heory of promotion based on evaluations by the already promoted. The already promoted show some favoritism toward candidates for promotion with similar beliefs, just as beetles are more prone to eat the eggs of other species. With such egg-eating bias, false beliefs may not be eliminated by the promotion system. An application is to the scientific process; another application is to hierarchical organizations. In organizations, egg-eating bias can result in the capture of the top of organizations by the wrong-minded.</li>
+<li><a href="https://www.bitss.org/the-persistence-of-false-paradigms-in-low-power-sciences/" target="_blank">Nontechnical summary for the Berkeley Initiative for Transparency in the Social Sciences</a></li>
+<li><a href="https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w23523/w23523.pdf" target="_blank">Previous version of the paper (2017)</a> – This version of the paper develops a heory of promotion based on evaluations by the already promoted. The already promoted show some favoritism toward candidates for promotion with similar beliefs, just as beetles are more prone to eat the eggs of other species. With such egg-eating bias, false beliefs may not be eliminated by the promotion system. An application is to the scientific process; another application is to hierarchical organizations. In organizations, egg-eating bias can result in the capture of the top of organizations by the wrong-minded.</li>
 </ul>
 
   </div>