Clean paper pages

content/papers/1.md

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 + [Code and data](https://github.com/pmichaillat/job-rationing)

content/papers/10.md

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content/papers/11.md

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 + [Phase diagrams](https://github.com/pmichaillat/wunk)

content/papers/12.md

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-- [Online appendix](/12a.pdf)
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++ [Paper](/12.pdf)
++ [Online appendix](/12a.pdf)
++ [Code and data](https://github.com/pmichaillat/p-hacking)
 
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content/papers/13.md

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content/papers/2.md

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content/papers/3.md

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content/papers/4.md

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content/papers/6.md

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content/papers/7.md

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content/papers/9.md

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public/1/index.html

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   "keywords": [
     "business cycles", "job rationing", "matching function", "unemployment", "wage rigidity"
   ],
-  "articleBody": " View Paper Online appendix Code and data Abstract This paper proposes a search-and-matching model of unemployment in which jobs are rationed: the labor market does not clear in the absence of matching frictions. This job shortage arises in an economic equilibrium from the combination of some wage rigidity and diminishing marginal returns to labor. In recessions, job rationing is acute, driving the rise in unemployment, whereas matching frictions contribute little to unemployment. Intuitively in recessions, jobs are lacking, the labor market is slack, and recruiting is easy and inexpensive, so matching frictions do not matter much. In a calibrated model, cyclical fluctuations in the composition of unemployment are large.\nFigure 5: Rationing and frictional unemployment in the United States, 1964–2009 Citation Michaillat, Pascal. 2012. “Do Matching Frictions Explain Unemployment? Not in Bad Times.” American Economic Review 102 (4): 1721–1750. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.4.1721 .\n@article{M12, author = {Pascal Michaillat}, year = {2012}, title = {Do Matching Frictions Explain Unemployment? Not in Bad Times}, journal = {American Economic Review}, volume = {102}, number = {4}, pages = {1721--1750}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.4.1721}} Related material Presentation slides ",
-  "wordCount" : "181",
+  "articleBody": " Paper Online appendix Code and data Abstract This paper proposes a search-and-matching model of unemployment in which jobs are rationed: the labor market does not clear in the absence of matching frictions. This job shortage arises in an economic equilibrium from the combination of some wage rigidity and diminishing marginal returns to labor. In recessions, job rationing is acute, driving the rise in unemployment, whereas matching frictions contribute little to unemployment. Intuitively in recessions, jobs are lacking, the labor market is slack, and recruiting is easy and inexpensive, so matching frictions do not matter much. In a calibrated model, cyclical fluctuations in the composition of unemployment are large.\nFigure 5: Rationing and frictional unemployment in the United States, 1964–2009 Citation Michaillat, Pascal. 2012. “Do Matching Frictions Explain Unemployment? Not in Bad Times.” American Economic Review 102 (4): 1721–1750. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.4.1721 .\n@article{M12, author = {Pascal Michaillat}, year = {2012}, title = {Do Matching Frictions Explain Unemployment? Not in Bad Times}, journal = {American Economic Review}, volume = {102}, number = {4}, pages = {1721--1750}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.4.1721}} Related material Presentation slides ",
+  "wordCount" : "180",
   "inLanguage": "en",
   "image":"https://pascalmichaillat.org/1.png","datePublished": "2012-06-01T00:00:00Z",
   "dateModified": "2012-06-01T00:00:00Z",
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public/10/index.html

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   "keywords": [
     "differential equations", "metascience", "social psychology"
   ],
-  "articleBody": " View Paper Online appendix Abstract We develop a model describing how false paradigms may persist, hindering scientific progress. The model features two paradigms, one describing reality better than the other. Tenured scientists display homophily: they favor tenure candidates who adhere to their paradigm. As in statistics, power is the probability (absent any bias) of denying tenure to scientists adhering to the false paradigm. The model shows that because of homophily, when power is low, the false paradigm may prevail. Then only an increase in power can ignite convergence to the true paradigm. Historical case studies suggest that low power comes either from lack of empirical evidence, or from reluctance to base tenure decisions on available evidence.\nSignificance It is believed that a lack of experimental evidence (typical in the social sciences) slows but does not prevent the adoption of true theories. We evaluate this belief using a model of scientific research and promotion in which tenured scientists are slightly biased toward tenure candidates with similar beliefs. We find that when a science lacks evidence to discriminate between theories, or when tenure decisions do not rely on available evidence, true theories may not be adopted. The nonadoption of heliocentric theory in the 16th century, the persistence of bloodletting in the 19th century, the nonadoption of underconsumption theory in the early 20th century, and the persistence of radical mastectomy in the 20th century illustrate such risk.\nFigure 1: Dynamics of the share of Better scientists in the tenured population Citation Akerlof, George A., and Pascal Michaillat. 2018. “Persistence of False Paradigms in Low-Power Sciences.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115 (52): 13228–13233. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1816454115 .\n@article{AM18, author = {George A. Akerlof and Pascal Michaillat}, year = {2018}, title = {Persistence of False Paradigms in Low-Power Sciences}, journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences}, volume = {115}, number = {52}, pages = {13228--13233}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1816454115}} Related material Previous version of the paper (2017) – This version of the paper develops a heory of promotion based on evaluations by the already promoted. The already promoted show some favoritism toward candidates for promotion with similar beliefs, just as beetles are more prone to eat the eggs of other species. With such egg-eating bias, false beliefs may not be eliminated by the promotion system. An application is to the scientific process; another application is to hierarchical organizations. In organizations, egg-eating bias can result in the capture of the top of organizations by the wrong-minded. ",
-  "wordCount" : "412",
+  "articleBody": " Paper Online appendix Abstract We develop a model describing how false paradigms may persist, hindering scientific progress. The model features two paradigms, one describing reality better than the other. Tenured scientists display homophily: they favor tenure candidates who adhere to their paradigm. As in statistics, power is the probability (absent any bias) of denying tenure to scientists adhering to the false paradigm. The model shows that because of homophily, when power is low, the false paradigm may prevail. Then only an increase in power can ignite convergence to the true paradigm. Historical case studies suggest that low power comes either from lack of empirical evidence, or from reluctance to base tenure decisions on available evidence.\nSignificance It is believed that a lack of experimental evidence (typical in the social sciences) slows but does not prevent the adoption of true theories. We evaluate this belief using a model of scientific research and promotion in which tenured scientists are slightly biased toward tenure candidates with similar beliefs. We find that when a science lacks evidence to discriminate between theories, or when tenure decisions do not rely on available evidence, true theories may not be adopted. The nonadoption of heliocentric theory in the 16th century, the persistence of bloodletting in the 19th century, the nonadoption of underconsumption theory in the early 20th century, and the persistence of radical mastectomy in the 20th century illustrate such risk.\nFigure 1: Dynamics of the share of Better scientists in the tenured population Citation Akerlof, George A., and Pascal Michaillat. 2018. “Persistence of False Paradigms in Low-Power Sciences.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115 (52): 13228–13233. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1816454115 .\n@article{AM18, author = {George A. Akerlof and Pascal Michaillat}, year = {2018}, title = {Persistence of False Paradigms in Low-Power Sciences}, journal = {Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences}, volume = {115}, number = {52}, pages = {13228--13233}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1816454115}} Related material Previous version of the paper (2017) – This version of the paper develops a heory of promotion based on evaluations by the already promoted. The already promoted show some favoritism toward candidates for promotion with similar beliefs, just as beetles are more prone to eat the eggs of other species. With such egg-eating bias, false beliefs may not be eliminated by the promotion system. An application is to the scientific process; another application is to hierarchical organizations. In organizations, egg-eating bias can result in the capture of the top of organizations by the wrong-minded. ",
+  "wordCount" : "411",
   "inLanguage": "en",
   "image":"https://pascalmichaillat.org/10.png","datePublished": "2018-12-26T00:00:00Z",
   "dateModified": "2018-12-26T00:00:00Z",
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public/11/index.html

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   "keywords": [
     "business cycles", "differential equations", "government spending", "monetary policy", "New Keynesian model", "optimal control", "social psychology", "wealth in the utility"
   ],
-  "articleBody": " View Paper Online appendix Phase diagrams Abstract At the zero lower bound, the New Keynesian model predicts that output and inflation collapse to implausibly low levels and that government spending and forward guidance have implausibly large effects. To resolve these anomalies, we introduce wealth into the utility function; the justification is that wealth is a marker of social status, and people value status. Since people partly save to accrue social status, the Euler equation is modified. As a result, when the marginal utility of wealth is sufficiently large, the dynamical system representing the zero-lower-bound equilibrium transforms from a saddle to a source, which resolves all the anomalies.\nFigure 1: Phase diagrams of the New Keynesian (NK) and wealth-in-the-utility New Keynesian (WUNK) models Citation Michaillat, Pascal, and Emmanuel Saez. 2021. “Resolving New Keynesian Anomalies with Wealth in the Utility Function.” Review of Economics and Statistics 103 (2): 197–215. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00893 .\n@article{MS21, author = {Pascal Michaillat and Emmanuel Saez}, year = {2021}, title ={Resolving {N}ew {K}eynesian Anomalies with Wealth in the Utility Function}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, volume = {103}, number = {2}, pages = {197--215}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00893}} Related material Presentation slides ",
-  "wordCount" : "194",
+  "articleBody": " Paper Online appendix Phase diagrams Abstract At the zero lower bound, the New Keynesian model predicts that output and inflation collapse to implausibly low levels and that government spending and forward guidance have implausibly large effects. To resolve these anomalies, we introduce wealth into the utility function; the justification is that wealth is a marker of social status, and people value status. Since people partly save to accrue social status, the Euler equation is modified. As a result, when the marginal utility of wealth is sufficiently large, the dynamical system representing the zero-lower-bound equilibrium transforms from a saddle to a source, which resolves all the anomalies.\nFigure 1: Phase diagrams of the New Keynesian (NK) and wealth-in-the-utility New Keynesian (WUNK) models Citation Michaillat, Pascal, and Emmanuel Saez. 2021. “Resolving New Keynesian Anomalies with Wealth in the Utility Function.” Review of Economics and Statistics 103 (2): 197–215. https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00893 .\n@article{MS21, author = {Pascal Michaillat and Emmanuel Saez}, year = {2021}, title ={Resolving {N}ew {K}eynesian Anomalies with Wealth in the Utility Function}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, volume = {103}, number = {2}, pages = {197--215}, url = {https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00893}} Related material Presentation slides ",
+  "wordCount" : "193",
   "inLanguage": "en",
   "image":"https://pascalmichaillat.org/11.png","datePublished": "2021-05-10T00:00:00Z",
   "dateModified": "2021-05-10T00:00:00Z",
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public/12/index.html

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   "keywords": [
     "metascience"
   ],
-  "articleBody": " View Paper Online appendix Code and data Abstract P-hacking is prevalent in reality but absent from classical hypothesis-testing theory. We therefore build a model of hypothesis testing that accounts for p-hacking. From the model, we derive critical values such that, if they are used to determine significance, and if p-hacking adjusts to the new significance standards, spurious significant results do not occur more often than intended. Because of p-hacking, such robust critical values are larger than classical critical values. In the model calibrated to medical science, the robust critical value is the classical critical value for the same test statistic but with one fifth of the significance level.\nFigure 3: Critical values robust to p-hacking for z-tests with significance level of 5% Citation McCloskey, Adam, and Pascal Michaillat. 2024. “Critical Values Robust to P-hacking.” Review of Economics and Statistics. Forthcoming.\n@article{MM24, author = {Adam McCloskey and Pascal Michaillat}, year = {2024}, title = {Critical Values Robust to P-hacking}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, note = {Forthcoming}} ",
-  "wordCount" : "168",
+  "articleBody": " Paper Online appendix Code and data Abstract P-hacking is prevalent in reality but absent from classical hypothesis-testing theory. We therefore build a model of hypothesis testing that accounts for p-hacking. From the model, we derive critical values such that, if they are used to determine significance, and if p-hacking adjusts to the new significance standards, spurious significant results do not occur more often than intended. Because of p-hacking, such robust critical values are larger than classical critical values. In the model calibrated to medical science, the robust critical value is the classical critical value for the same test statistic but with one fifth of the significance level.\nFigure 3: Critical values robust to p-hacking for z-tests with significance level of 5% Citation McCloskey, Adam, and Pascal Michaillat. 2024. “Critical Values Robust to P-hacking.” Review of Economics and Statistics. Forthcoming.\n@article{MM24, author = {Adam McCloskey and Pascal Michaillat}, year = {2024}, title = {Critical Values Robust to P-hacking}, journal = {Review of Economics and Statistics}, note = {Forthcoming}} ",
+  "wordCount" : "167",
   "inLanguage": "en",
   "image":"https://pascalmichaillat.org/12.png","datePublished": "2024-03-04T00:00:00Z",
   "dateModified": "2024-03-04T00:00:00Z",
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