Fix XSS vulnerability via unsafe rendering of objects in link text #1483
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We (sloppily and unnecessarily) wrapped object toStrings in Html() when rendering links. This resulted in a vulnerability where a user could put XSS in their name and it would be rendered via name links. This is fixed via a better separation between text and html content passed to the link renderering partial and by not arbitrarily assuming names are safe. Additionally, the highlighter has another method for explicitely non-tagged text which is sanitised. TODO: more auditing of the existing highlighting method, which needs to handle mixed content. Possibly server-side scrubbing of some fields. Fixes EHRI#1482
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We (sloppily and unnecessarily) wrapped object toStrings in Html() when rendering links. This resulted in a vulnerability where a user could put XSS in their name and it would be rendered via name links.
This is fixed via a better separation between text and html content passed to the link renderering partial and by not arbitrarily assuming names are safe. Additionally, the highlighter has another method for explicitely non-tagged text which is sanitised.
TODO: more auditing of the existing highlighting method, which needs to handle mixed content. Possibly server-side scrubbing of some fields.
Fixes #1482