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+---
+title: The Formal Mechanical Process, Section 1
+description:
+    Learn about the first section of the Formal Mechanical Process from Hegel's
+    Science of Logic
+isArticle: true
+authors: Ahilleas Rokni (2024)
+editors: Filip Niklas (2024)
+---
+
+## (a) The Formal Mechanical Process: Section 1
+
+The Mechanical Process in the Science of Logic consists of two headings: (a) The
+Formal Mechanical Process and (b) The Real Mechanical Process. In this article,
+I will deal with the first section of (a) The Formal Mechanical Process.
+
+The section begins with the following: “The mechanical process is the positing
+of what is contained in the Notion of mechanism, and therefore, in the first
+instance, of a _contradiction_” (Hegel 1991, 716). The “concept” of Mechanism is
+the logical moment with which the section, A. The Mechanical Object finished.
+The `mechanical object` is now a negative unity: the negativity of having the
+identical determinateness to other mechanical objects whilst being indifferent
+to them. This is the contradiction with which A. The Mechanical Object
+concludes. This contradiction is now explored further in the (a) The Formal
+Mechanical Process.
+
+Above, Hegel writes that it is the “positing” of the contradiction in the
+`mechanical object` that gets the mechanical process started and it is worth
+dwelling on this for a moment. Hegel explains that by “positing” he means,
+
+> It follows from the Notion just indicated that the interaction of objects
+> takes the form of the _positing_ of the _identical_ relation of the objects.
+> This consists merely in giving to the determinateness that is determined, the
+> form of _universality_; this is _communication_, which does not involve
+> transition into an opposite (Hegel 1991, 716).
+
+Thus, the “positing” is an expression of the logical interaction of objects that
+relate to each other as identical. But where has this logical interaction come
+from? If we cast our minds back to the conclusion of A. The Mechanical Object
+[section-3](/articles/hegel/reference/mechanical-object/section-3) we will
+recall that the contradiction was more specifically conceptualised as a negative
+unity. This negativity is the interaction of the `mechanical object` with
+another `mechanical object` – whereby a `mechanical object` has both an
+identical determinateness to another `mechanical object`, whilst being
+indifferent to it.
+
+The negativity of the contradiction, then, logically unfolds as the positing of
+their identical determinateness. At this point, one might legitimately ask: why
+is the first positing that of their identity and not that of their indifference
+to each other? The answer must be: because it is their identity that binds them
+into a relation with one another. It is because they have an identical
+determinateness that there is a negative _unity_ in the first place, and it is
+because of their identical determinateness that an interaction can take place.
+Thus, the identical relation is posited.
+
+The logical result of this positing is that the identical determinateness of the
+`mechanical objects` is itself determined. In other words, the logical structure
+of that identity is posited and in being posited is hardened (determined) into
+an actual moment between `mechanical objects`. Their identity is no longer just
+one side of a contradiction, but it has its day in the Sun, it is determined as
+a moment of what it is for the `mechanical object` to be in a formal mechanical
+relation with another `mechanical object`.
+
+Accordingly, because their identity is determined, their relation takes the form
+of a `universal` – there is nothing other than `mechanical objects` and these
+`mechanical objects` relate to each other as identical.[^1] Hegel calls this
+`communication` and, crucially, adds that it “does not involve transition into
+an opposite” (Hegel 1991, 716).
+
+The `communication` between `mechanical objects` is a movement of identical
+determinations, and so strictly speaking, there is no change from one thing to
+something different. It is quite simply the identical determinateness that
+exists between `mechanical objects` – a kind of ether of determinateness that
+connects all objects together but does not affect them beyond connecting them.
+
+[^1]:
+    See
+    [first-paragraph](/articles/hegel/reference/mechanical-object/first-paragraph).
+
+### Communication Between Objects
+
+Hegel then embarks on a remark that helpfully unpacks what he has in mind with
+the logical determination of `communication`. He writes:
+
+> _Spiritual communication_, which moreover takes place in that element which is
+> the universal in the form of universality, is explicitly an _ideal_ relation
+> in which _a determinateness continues_ itself from one person into another
+> unimpaired, and universalizes itself without any alteration whatever-as a
+> scent freely spreads in the unresisting atmosphere. But even in communication
+> between material objects, their determinateness _spreads_, so to speak, in a
+> similarly ideal manner; personality is an infinitely more intense
+> _impenetrability_ [*Harte*] than objects possess (Hegel 1991, 716).
+
+The above paragraph provides a series of concrete instances of `communication`.
+Crucially, the examples given are all of the kind of communication that occurs
+between objects; Hegel makes the point to distinguish the kind of communication
+between objects to something like personality, which “is an infinitely more
+intense _impenetrability_ [*Harte*] than objects possess” (Hegel 1991, 716).
+This is an excellent opportunity to look closely at Hegel’s examples as they
+provide a window into how he thinks about the real-world instances of the
+logical development. If we spend a bit of time unpacking Hegel’s examples and
+scrutinising their validity, we will get a clearer understanding of
+communication its its technical sense and ontological status.
+
+Beginning with Hegel’s first example, that of a scent diffusing in an atmosphere
+where there is no restriction on the diffusion of the scent. Why does Hegel
+think that this is a helpful example of how `communication` is exemplified in
+everyday life? At first glance, it makes sense. The way a scent freely diffuses
+itself around an atmosphere so that the whole atmosphere smells of the scent is
+reminiscent of the identical determinateness of the `mechanical object` that
+leads to it becoming a universal. However, how _exactly_ are we supposed to
+understand this? Is the mechanical process at work between the scented molecules
+and the non-scented molecules, or is it just between the scented molecules? To
+pose this question is, I think, to overstep the conceptual restrictions of
+Mechanism and mechanistic thought. The distinction between a scented molecule
+and a non-scented molecule does not obtain within a mechanistic framework
+because, as `mechanical objects`, they do not have different determinations
+(_i.e._ one is scented and the other is non-scented). Quite simply, scented
+molecules and non-scented molecules have an identical determinateness.
+
+What the above example provides us with, is a way of thinking about the abstract
+logical structure of `communication` in a concrete way. The diffusion of the
+scent is the unimpeded movement of the identical determinateness of
+`mechanical objects` and the fact that a scent will diffuse throughout a room
+and thus universalises itself within the room - in the sense that the scent can
+be smelt throughout the room. As such, Hegel's account of `communication` gives
+a philosophical explanation for why a scent diffuses through a room. Note, a
+philosophical explanation does not seek to provide the material causes for why a
+scent diffuses in a room. It explains what the (onto-)logical reasons for scent
+diffusion are. These ontological reasons are: all of the particles in a room are
+treated as the same, they are all `mechanical objects`; and the diffusion of the
+scent, then, is explained by the fact that the particles share an identical
+determinateness - they are identical.
+
+A final note. This does not supplant a materialist explanation. Nor is it merely
+a description of what is going on. The ontological reasons exist side-by-side
+the materialist causes. The ontological reasons provide the conditions under
+which the material causes can then find expression in the world. It is only
+because particles or `mechanical objects` are identical to each other that the
+diffusion of a scent in external reality can occur. Because, it is a
+philosophical position to conceptualise all objects as identical - it is not
+self-evident from the diversity of objects that we see around us.
+
+### Interlude: How does the Science of Logic relate to External Reality? (Rokni)
+
+A further philosophical conundrum poses itself. Above, I said that the
+distinction between a scented molecule and a non-scented molecule does not
+obtain within a mechanistic framework. This mode of thinking about how the
+logical determinations are reflected in everyday occurrences suggests that the
+same object can be thought of within a mechanistic framework, as well as other
+frameworks. Take the human body,for example, one could conceive of it purely in
+mechanistic terms and theorise of its processes in terms of cause and effect, or
+one could conceive of it in organicist terms and conceive of its processes
+differently. Now, what is crucial about this example is that it works because
+mechanistic thinking is more reductive than organicist thinking – the reverse
+would not be possible. One could not conceive of a rock within an organicist
+framework. Thus, the possibility of an object to be conceived within a plurality
+of frameworks requires that the object is open to reductionism.
+
+Now, a further thought. This does not mean that it is equally correct to
+conceive of the same object through the prism of multiple frameworks. The human
+body is an organic thing and so to conceive of it as a `mechanical object` is to
+misconstrue it. It _can_ be done but you are failing to fully grasp what it is a
+for a human body to be what it is. Let us hold onto this reflection and turn
+back to the example of the diffusion of scent. Since we are within the realm of
+Mechanism, the simplest way that we have to conceive of the scented and the
+non-scented molecules is as `mechanical objects`[^2].
+
+[^2]:
+    Of course, one could conceive of them as a `syllogism` or a `judgement`, but
+    then they would cease to be conceived of as objects. Instead, they would be
+    conceived of as concepts. It is plausible that one would have a more
+    accurate conception of them through a chemical framework, as found in
+    `Chemism`, which actually takes into account their different
+    determinateness. But for now, they are `mechanical objects` whose
+    determinateness is identical.
+
+### The Ideality of Communication
+
+Looking at the second half of the first paragraph of (a)The Formal Mechanical
+Process, Hegel writes that: “But even in communication between material objects,
+their determinateness spreads, so to speak, in a similarly ideal manner” (Hegel
+1991, 716). When talking about the diffusion of scent amongst molecules one
+might get the false impression that `communication` is the kind of process that
+only works with ideal, non-material objects. Now, It looks as if in Hegel's time
+scent was thought to be transmitted in a non-material way. Obviously, this is no
+longer the case, but Hegel's point is clear: `communication` is an ideal process
+that occurs between material objects. In other words, it is not just material
+processes that occur between material objects. Here, Hegel is clearly going
+against a materialist/mechanistic worldview whereby the only processes are
+_material_ processes. Perhaps Hegel is thinking of forces and, perhaps more
+specifically, the force of gravity as an example of `communication`.
+
+At the end of this long paragraph where Hegel gives examples of `communication`,
+he expands on an important _logical_ dimension of this moment. He writes:
+
+> The formal totality of the object in general, which is indifferent to the
+> determinateness and hence is not a self-determination, makes it
+> undistinguished from the other object and thus renders the interaction
+> primarily an unimpeded continuation of the determinateness of the one in the
+> other (Hegel 1991, 716).
+
+`Communication` does not work simply because the determinateness between
+`mechanical objects` is identical but also because they are indifferent to
+determination. Their indifference means that the identical determinateness, in
+other words, the determinateness that is _communicated_, continues from one
+object to the other without any alteration in that determinateness. It just
+continues exactly as it did from the beginning. Thus, not only does
+`communication` begin from the identity of `mechanical objects` but it also
+continues with that identity throughout the interaction.
+
+Hegel, then, concludes this section on `communication` with an analysis of how
+it functions in the “spiritual sphere” (Hegel 1991, 716). By spiritual sphere,
+Hegel has in mind the following: “Laws, morals, rational conceptions in general”
+(Hegel 1991, 716). There are laws in a society, and these laws pervade (are
+communicated) throughout society without any obstruction or alteration. The same
+with morals, what a society takes to be right or wrong is immediately
+communicated throughout the society and, again, there is no alteration of
+morality (on a social level) as it goes from individual to individual.[^3]
+
+[^3]:
+    Of course, this is based on an understanding of individuals within a society
+    as mechanical objects that are part of mechanical processes. From this
+    paragraph alone, it is not clear whether Hegel thinks that laws or morals
+    are examples of `communication` or that he thinks that _they can be_ used or
+    expressed in the form of `communication`. I suspect that he thinks that the
+    proliferation of laws, customs, etc, are logically structured according to
+    `communication`. See (Ross 2013).
+
+### How Communication is different to Intelligence
+
+Let us have a look at the first sentence of this paragraph to get a better
+understanding of what Hegel is going for:
+
+> Now in the spiritual sphere there is an infinitely manifold content that is
+> communicable; for being taken up into intelligence it receives this _form_ of
+> universality in which it becomes communicable. But the universal that is such
+> not merely through the form but in and for itself, is the _objective_ as such,
+> both in the spiritual and in the material sphere; as against which the
+> individuality of outer objects as well as of persons is an unessential element
+> that can offer it no resistance (Hegel 1991, 716).
+
+The paragraph begins with an example that does not fall within the purview of
+`communication` because it is concerned with “intelligence” (Hegel 1991, 716).
+Intelligence, then, does not fall within the logical remit of Mechanism. If we
+just focus on the text, however, intelligence has the effect of giving the form
+of universality to a content and thereby making it communicable. There are 2
+logical steps to clarify here: (1) intelligence takes on a manifold content and
+gives it the form of universality – a capacity that intelligence has, and (2)
+intelligence is able to communicate the content _because_ it has the form of
+universality, _i.e._ a communicated content, whether it be through the
+`formal mechanical process` or through intelligence, must be universalised in
+order to be communicated.[^4]
+
+[^4]:
+    It would be a fascinating thread of further research to explain exactly why
+    intelligence has the capacity to give the form of universality to manifold
+    content. I suspect that a good place to start for such an enquiry would be
+    the 'Philosophy of Spirit'.
+
+This is in stark contrast to the kind of universalisable content that an
+intelligence can try to communicate. As we saw above, the content of an
+intelligence can be given the form of a universal, but the fact that it is not
+in-and-for-itself a universal means that its content can be resisted, i.e. I am
+not automatically within the remit of Kant's conception of the moral law just
+because it has the form of universality – my individuality has the power to
+resist. It is not the case with the `formal mechanical process' where resistance
+is not even an option. On a mechanistic conception of society, i.e. where
+citizens and political institutions are conceived of as mechanical objects that
+participate within the formal mechanical processes, there is quite simply total
+and an automatic acquiescence to the moral law and/or the law.
+
+[^5]:
+    See
+    [first-paragraph](/articles/hegel/reference/mechanical-object/first-paragraph).